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MARITIME ATTACHMENT-AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY
-ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFERS-FED. R. CIV. P. RULE
B-REIBOR INT'L LTD. V. CARGO CARRIERS (KACZ-CO.)
LTD.--:*
INTRODUCTION
Perhaps nothing better exemplifies our modern age than today's bur-
geoning computer technology. With increasing pervasiveness, this tech-
nology is making its mark on the venerable heritage of international
trade and commerce. The International Chamber of Commerce, for ex-
ample, recognizing the increasing use of modern electronic transmis-
sion systems, recently effected new rules for the writing of letters of
credit, designed "to update a system that has fostered trade for more
than a thousand years."' It should not be surprising, however, that any
meeting of the old and new might engender dispute and raise perplex-
ing legal issues. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit recently decided one such dispute in Reibor Int'l Ltd. v. Cargo
Carriers (Kacz-Co.) Ltd.2
In Reibor, the plaintiff vessel owner, Reibor International, entered
into a charter partys with the defendant charterer, Cargo Carriers, for
the carriage of cement from Spain to Jordan.4 In order to facilitate
payment for the cargo and its carriage, the Jordanian buyer of the ce-
ment opened a letter of credit in Madrid, Spain.6 The Spanish seller of
* This comment was researched and written while the author was employed on a
part-time basis by the law firm representing Reibor International. The author took no
part in the research or litigation of the case.
1. Sterngold, New Rules for Letters of Credit, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1984, at DI, col. 6.
The rules, written by the International Chamber of Commerce as the Uniform Customs
and Practice for Documentary Credits, became effective as UCP 400 on October 1, 1984.
Id.
2. 759 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1985).
3. "A charter party.., is a contract by which an entire ship or some principal part
thereof is let to a merchant, called the charterer, for the conveyance of goods on a deter-
mined voyage to one or more places or until the expiration of a specified period." 1 E.
JHIRAD, A. SANN & B. CHASE, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 225 (7th ed. 1983).
4. Appellant's Brief at 3, Reibor Int'l Ltd. v. Cargo Carriers (Kacz-Co.) Ltd., 759 F.2d
262 (2d Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Reibor Brief].
5. A letter of credit has been defined as "an engagement by a bank or other person
made at the request of a customer ... that the issuer will honor drafts or other demands
for payment upon compliance with the conditions specified in the credit." U.C.C. § 5-
103(1)(a) (1978). The importance of the letter of credit, today the primary means of
securing payment in international trade, is that it:
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the cement was named beneficiary of the letter of credit,' and the de-
fendant also became a beneficiary of irrevocable instructions by which
it would receive a portion of the proceeds of the letter in payment for
carriage.7 The payment was to be made by Manufacturers Hanover
Trust (MHT), the bank issuing the letter of credit,' in Madrid. Even-
tually, this payment was to reach defendant's account at the Royal
Bank of Canada (RBC) in Montreal.9
In January 1983, Reibor instituted the subject action against
Cargo Carriers in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York.10 Pursuant to its complaint in this action, the
plaintiff applied for, and the district court issued, processes of mari-
time attachment and garnishment 1 against garnishees MHT and RBC,
[S]ubstitutes a bank's credit for that of a customer and thereby facilitates pay-
ment from buyer to seller .. . By using the letter of credit the buyer can find
comfort in knowing that the shipment has been made before he is called upon to
pay and the seller knows that he will be paid as soon as he ships regardless of
any change in the buyer's financial standing.
P. OPPENHEIM. INTERNATIONAL BANKING 154 (4th ed. 1983). See generally Deak, Letters
of Credit (Documentary Credit), 2 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 229 (1981).
6. "A 'beneficiary' of a credit is a person who is entitled under its terms to draw or
demand payment." U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(d) (1978).
7. "[Ojnce an irrevocable credit is established as regards... the beneficiary it can be
modified or revoked only with his consent." U.C.C. § 5-106(2) (1978).
8. "An 'issuer' is a bank or other person issuing a credit." U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(c) (1978).
9. Reibor Int'l Ltd. v. Cargo Carriers (Kacz-Co.) Ltd., No. 83-793, slip op. at 2
(S.D.N.Y. July 24, 1984).
10. Reibor Brief, supra note 4, at 4-5. In its complaint, plaintiff alleged that defend-
ant had wrongfully cancelled the charter and had failed to pay demurrage, interest on
late freight payments, and the cost of excess bunkers consumed by the vessels prior to
the wrongful cancellation. Id. at 3.
11. See FED. R. Civ. P. B(1). Rule B(1) states:
With respect to any admiralty or maritime claim in personam a verified
complaint may contain a prayer for process to attach the defendant's goods and
chattels, or credits and effects in the hands of garnishees to be named in the
process to the amount sued for, if the defendant shall not be found within the
district. Such a complaint shall be accompanied by an affidavit signed by the
plaintiff or his attorney that, to the afliant's knowledge, or to the best of his
information and belief, the defendant cannot be found within the district. The
verified complaint and affidavit shall be reviewed by the court and, if the condi-
tions set forth in this rule appear to exist, an order so stating and authorizing
process of attachment and garnishment shall issue. Supplemental process en-
forcing the court's order may be issued by the clerk upon application without
further order of the court. If the plaintiff or his attorney certifies that exigent
circumstances make reveiw by the court impracticable, the clerk shall issue a
summons and process of attachment and garnishment and the plaintiff shall
have the burden on a post-attachment hearing under Rule E(4)(f) to show that
exigent circumstances existed. In addition, or in the alternative, the plaintiff
may, pursuant to Rule 4(e), invoke the remedies provided by the state law for
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directing the garnishees to attach "a portion of the proceeds under a
letter of credit (No. E70482) that the Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Company is instructed to release to said defendant through the Royal
Bank of Canada. .. .
The payment that Reibor was attempting to attach in New York
was effected from Madrid to Montreal through the Clearing House In-
terbank Payments System (CHIPS) in New York.13 The transfer
moved from the account of the Spanish cement seller at MHT in Ma-
drid to the MHT branch in New York, to RBC in New York and fi-
nally to the defendant's account with RBC in Montreal. Since both
MHT and RBC are CHIPS participants, the payment passed through
the New York branches of the two banks, and it was at these two
branches that Reibor attempted to garnish the transferring funds."
Reibor served its first Process of Maritime Attachment and Gar-
nishment against MHT on January 28, 1983. MHT answered on Feb-
ruary 7, 1983 that it had no property of defendant Cargo Carriers."'
MHT was again served with garnishment process on February 8. On
February 11, at approximately 10:25 a.m., Reibor served its garnish-
ment process on RBC. On that same day, at approximately 2:20 p.m.,
MHT was advised by its Madrid branch to credit RBC.'1 At 2:21 p.m.
that afternoon, RBC in New York received a CHIPS credit advice'
7
from MHT in.the amount of $180,000, with instructions to credit RBC
in Montreal with reference to Cargo Carriers."' One hour later, at 3:22
p.m., RBC in New York credited RBC in Montreal with $180,000.1'
The garnishee banks in New York did not garnish the funds, and the
district court denied the plaintiff's resulting motion for an order di-
recting the garnishees to provide security.20 Thus, the stage was set for
attachment and garnishment or similar seizure of the defendant's property. Ex-
cept for Rule E(8) these Supplemental Rules do not apply to state remedies so
invoked.
Id.
12. Reibor Brief, supra note 4, at 5.
13. Reibor, No. 93-793, slip op. at 2. The Spanish cement seller's account at MHT in
Madrid had presumably received payment for the sale of the cement from proceeds of
the letter of credit opened by the Jordanian buyer; payment was then effected from the
Spanish cement seller's account to Cargo Carrier's account with RBC in Montreal pursu-
ant to the irrevocable instructions. See Reibor, 759 F.2d at 263.
14. Reibor Brief, supra note 4, at 5-7.
15. Id. at 5. See also FED. R. Civ. P. B(3)(a).
16. Reibor Brief, supra note 4, at 5-6.
17. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
18. Appellee [RBC]'s Brief at 4, Reibor Int'l Ltd. v. Cargo Carriers (Kacz-Co.) Ltd.,
759 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1985) [hereinafter RBC Brief].
19. Id.
20. Reibor, No. 83-793, slip op. at 1. See FED. R. Civ. P. B(3)(a), E(5)(a).
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a legal confrontation, which pitted the "old" regiment against the
'"new."
A. The Clearing House Interbank Payments System
The element of the "new" system represented in the dispute was
the CHIPS computerized funds clearing house system, administered by
the New York Clearing House Association (NYCHA), 21 itself a vener-
able institution.22 NYCHA's governing Clearing House Committee,
composed of officers of twelve member banks,23 is authorized to "estab-
lish and/or maintain a Computer Department of the Clearing House
[CHIPS] and prescribe the rules and regulations under which it is to
be conducted. 2
4
Created by the NYCHA in 1970 to serve nine banks, CHIPS now
serves nearly 150 foreign and international banks and on an average
day transmits well over $200 billion.25 The system facilitates dollar
movements consisting largely of Eurodollars, foreign trade and foreign
currency transactions.26 "It has become a dominant player in interna-
tional transactions," one observer has written, and "is said to handle as
much as 90% of the dollar payments moving between the countries
around the world .... 27
21. See THE NEW YORK CLEARING HOUSE ASSOCIATION, CONSTITUTION OF THE NEW
YORK CLEARING HOUSE ASSOCIATION, art. VI, § 3(H) (1983) [hereinafter NYCHA
CONSTITUTION].
22. See The New York Clearing House Association, The New York Clearing House
Association (n.d.) [hereinafter NYCHA]. The Association was founded "to bring order
out of confusion in the chaotic exchange and settlement process among the banks of New
York City." Id. at 1. On October 11, 1853, 52 banks participated in the first exchange of
checks worth $22.6 million. Id. at 2.
23. NYCHA CONSTITUTION, supra note 21, art. V, § 1. The twelve banks currently
serving on the Committee are: The Bank of New York; The Chase Manhattan Bank
(N.A.); Citibank, N.A.; Chemical Bank; Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York;
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company; Marine Midland Bank, N.A.; United States
Trust Company of New York; National Westminster Bank USA; and European Ameri-
can Bank & Trust Company.
24. Id. at art. VI, § 3(H). This section also authorizes the Committee "in its discre-
tion [to] permit other than members [of NYCHA] to participate in [CHIPS] services."
Id. Currently 92 non-NYCHA banks participate in CHIPS. The New York Clearing
House Association, Clearing House Interbank Payments System (n.d.) [hereinafter
CHIPS]. See also NEW YORK CLEARING HOUSE ASSOCIATION, RULES GOVERNING THE
CLEARING HOUSE INTERBANK PAYMENTS SYSTEM, preamble (1981) [hereinafter CHIPS
Rules]; Comment, Risk Allocation in International Interbank Electronic Funds Trans-
fers: CHIPS & SWIFT, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 621, 626-30 (1981).
25. CHIPS, supra note 24.
26. NYCHA, supra note 22, at 14.
27. Corporate EFT Report (n.p., n.d.), quoted in CHIPS, supra note 24.
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A model CHIPS transfer may be illustrated using the parties in
the Reibor action in their respective roles.2 8 All CHIPS participating
banks are linked by communications lines to the CHIPS central com-
puter.2 9 When the paying bank, in this case MHT in New York, initi-
ates a payment, it transmits the relevant data electronically to the
central computer, which immediately and electronically advises the re-
ceiving bank-in this case, RBC in New York. 0 During the course of a
day, in any number of payment instructions, all participating banks,
among them RBC and MHT, accumulate credits and debits, depending
on whether the individual bank receives or sends these payment in-
structions. The CHIPS central computer keeps track of all these pay-
ment instructions, and at 4:30 p.m., New York time, it stops accepting
payment instructions and advises each bank of the netted-out, aggre-
gate amounts due to or from each bank for that day.31 The settling
participants3 2 then confirm that they will settle for themselves and for
all other banks that settle through them.3 3 After this confirmation,
those settling banks that owe money send payment messages to a spe-
cial CHIPS settlement account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, maintained for the joint benefit of all settling banks." Once
NYCHA authorities confirm that the funding of the CHIPS settlement
account is correct, they authorize disbursements from the account to
those settling institutions that are owed money. By 6:00 p.m., the set-
tlement process is complete,3' and RBC in New York, having earlier in
the day been advised of the payment instruction from MHT via
CHIPS, now has the disbursed amount in hand. From RBC in New
York, of course, the payment is eventually credited to Cargo Carriers'
account at RBC in Montreal.
28. See also Delbrueck & Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 464 F. Supp. 989
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 609 F.2d 1047 (2d Cir. 1979). District Judge Broderick gave a complete
description of the "mechanics of effecting an interbank payment under the CHIPS sys-
tem." 464 F. Supp. at 992-93 n.5. One correction: Judge Broderick's description of next-
day settlement, id., no longer is true; CHIPS began same-day settlement on October 1,
1981. Bennett, Same-Day Settlement Begins Today for Banks, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1981,
at D1, col. 1.
29. CHIPS, supra note 24.
30. Id.
31. Id.; Comment, supra note 24, at 628.
32. A settling participant differs from a regular CHIPS participant insofar as the for-
mer is responsible for settling up the balances of its own account and the accounts of any
other participants for which it may settle. CHIPS Rules, supra note 24, Rules 1(b), (d).
"The settling banks have the ultimate responsibility for the settlement of transfers in
the system." Comment, supra note 24, at 626.
33. CHIPS supra note 24; CHIPS Rules, supra note 24, Rule 13.
34. CHIPS, supra note 24; Comment, supra note 24, at 629.
35. CHIPS, supra note 24.
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B. The Maritime Attachment Remedy
Confronting this representative of the new technology is the long-
standing admiralty practice of maritime attachment and garnishment,
codified as Rule B of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty
and Maritime Claims of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.36 An
early procedure of the ancient practice of admiralty law, attachment
and garnishment it was already a familiar proceeding in 1825, when the
Supreme Court recognized that "[tihe remedy by attachment, . . . to
compel appearance, has very respectable support in precedent .... Its
origin is to be found in the remotest history, as well of the civil as the
common law. ' 's7 A more specific reference to the antiquity of the rem-
edy was noted by the Supreme Court in 1873:
The use of the process of [maritime] attachment. by courts
of admiralty. . . has prevailed during a period extending as far
back as the authentic history of those tribunals can be traced
* . . . The rules by which it was regulated in the English admi-
ralty are found in Clerke's Praxis, a work still of authority,
published in the time of Elizabeth.3
The Supreme Court in Manro v. Almeida had explicitly recognized
the maritime attachment remedy, which had been discontinued in the
English courts."' One commentator in 1848 offered an explanation for
this development in the United States courts and, relying on an alter-
native source, indicated the primary justification in English legal his-
tory for the remedy:
["Sluppose that the person against whom a warrant has issued,
cannot be found, or that he lives in a foreign country; here the
ancient proceedings of the admiralty court provided an easy
and salutary remedy . . . . The goods of the party were at-
tached, to compel his appearance. By this means, if a foreigner
owed money in England, and any ship of his came into a Brit-
ish harbor, or any goods of his were found in these realms, they
36. FED. R. Civ. P. B. The Rule states in part:
With respect to any admiralty or maritime claim in personam a verified
complaint may contain a prayer for process to attach the defendant's goods and
chattels, or credits and effects in the hands of garnishees named in the com-
plaint to the amount sued for, if the defendant shall not be found within the
district.
Id.
37. Manro v. Almeida, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 473, 487, 490 (1825).
38. Atkins v. The Disintegrating Co., 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 272, 303 (1873).
39. 7A J. Mooan & A. PELAEZ, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE B.02 at B-51 (2d ed.
1983) [hereinafter MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE].
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were seized by his creditors; and by this means the English
creditor had an easy remedy for his debt, and the foreign
merchant acquired more credit in England, when it was so easy
to find remedy against him: for this process of attachment of
goods went not only against those in the actual possession of
himself, his factors or agents, but also against those in the
hands of his debtors. . . .This salutary proceeding has in lat-
ter times gone into disuse in England, and great is the mischief
accruing to commerce from the want of it.["] . . .It was proba-
bly under these views of the great utility of the process of at-
tachment, that the Supreme Court thought proper not only to
adopt it, but to increase its efficiency by directing its incorpo-
ration, in the first instance, with the warrant of arrest."
The circumstances of Reibor thus presented the court with two
issues: the threshold issue of the effectiveness of the attachment writ
on after-acquired property, and second, the attachability of the elec-
tronically transferred CHIPS credits. 4 Although Reibor served process
of the garnishment upon each garnishee twice,42 the Second Circuit af-
firmed the district court's finding that at the time process was served
on both garnishees, "neither had in its possession any property of the
defendant. . . .Consequently, the levies of attachment were absolutely
void when made."'43 In its affirmance, the Second Circuit agreed with
the district court that "the precedent in federal admiralty law is so
thin that we should turn tq state law more directly on point."4 4 The
court thus relied on New York attachment provisions'6 to invalidate
the attachments, and, therefore, did not reach the further issue of the
attachability of CHIPS credits.46
40. A. CONKLING, THE ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION, LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OP
THE UNITED STATES 478-79 (1848), quoted in 7A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note
39, B.02 at B-52 n.5. For a recent discussion on the authority of the federal judiciary
derived under Rule B(1), see Schiffahrtsgesellschaft Leonhardt & Co. v. A. Bottacchi
S.A. De Navegacion, 773 F.2d 1528, 1531-36 (11th Cir. 1985).
41. 759 F.2d at 265.
42. See Joint Appendix at A25-A37, Reibor Int'l Ltd. v. Cargo Carriers (Kacz-Co.)
Ltd., 759 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1985).
43. Reibor, No. 83-793, slip op. at 3. See also supra notes 15-19 and accompanying
text.
44. 759 F.2d at 266.
45. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 6214(b) (McKinney 1980). The district court recognized
that "questions of banking are matters for state regulation." Reibor, No. 83-793, slip op.
at 4. The court of appeals agreed and concluded that "[iut is only appropriate therefore
that we look to the New York law of attachment for guidance." 759 F.2d at 266. See
discussion infra, notes 76-103 and accompanying text.
46. 759 F.2d at 268-69.
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This comment will suggest an alternative view, that the court of
appeals's opinion was fraught with a hypertechnical interpretation of
the law which is in marked contrast to the traditional goals and appli-
cation of federal admiralty law. Accordingly, this comment will con-
tend that Federal law should govern the attachment, and that under a
traditional application of the admiralty law the service of process was
sufficient to require garnishment. Allowing that threshold result, the
comment will further examine the attachability of CHIPS credits.
Given the predicted future growth of electronic fund transfers in gen-
eral, and CHIPS in particular,' 7 it is likely that plaintiffs will increas-
ingly seek to utilize the maritime remedy of attachment against the
electronic transfer of funds. The issues involved in Reibor will be
brought to judicial attention time and again and the question will be
raised: how should electronic fund transfers, here in the form of
CHIPS credits, be treated under Rule B, the maritime remedy of at-
tachment? Although there are compelling arguments on both sides of
this issue, this comment will suggest that CHIPS credits should indeed
be attachable.
I. ATTACHMENT OF AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY
In its arguments before the court of appeals, Reibor sought to sus-
tain the garnishments as "having intercepted funds as they made their
way through New York."" Reibor first argued that "under federal mar-
itime law a Rule B attachment is and stays valid until the garnishee
answers, whether or not the garnishee possesses the property at the
time of service."' " In support of this proposition, Reibor cited three
cases, 5' which, as the court of appeals correctly pointed out, "only ob-
liquely graze the issue"'" of attachment of after-acquired property.
Consequently, the court, with varying degrees of ease, was able to dis-
tinguish all three cases.5a
47. CHIPS, supra note 24. The NYCHA has predicted "future growth ... in the
system's importance to international banking." Id.
48. 759 F.2d at 265.
49. Id.
50. Iran Express Lines v. Sumatrop, AG, 563 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1977); American
Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Naviera Andes Peruana, S.A., 208 F. Supp. 164 (N.D. Cal. 1962),
aff'd sub nom., San Rafael Compania Naviera, S.A. v. American Smelting & Ref. Co., 327
F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1964); DK Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Titan, 1964 A.M.C. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
51. 759 F.2d at 265.
52. DK Mfg. for example, considered after-identified property, not property acquired
after the service of the writ. 1964 A.M.C. at 79-80. Thus, the property of the defendant
was "under the control" of the garnishee bank at the time of service of the attachment
writ, but these funds were identified as such only sometime later. Id. at 80.
The Reibor court also considered the circumstances of American Smelting, 208 F.
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As the court recognized, there are few, if any, cases on this narrow
issue. Nonetheless, other bases of decision exist, concededly without
the precedential value of case law directly on point, but which support
a finding that federal law would allow attachment of after-acquired
property.
In its finding that an attachment is valid only when, inter alia,
"the goods or credits [are] presently within the district, '1 3 the district
court had relied specifically on the language of Rule B and generally on
Moore's Federal Practice. Rule B states: "[A] verified complaint may
contain a prayer for process to attach the defendant's goods and chat-
tels, or credits and effects in the hands of garnishees .... "" Moore's
Federal Practice, however, does not construe the emphasized phrase as
narrowly as the district court did. Rule B, wrote Professor Moore, per-
mits attachment, inter alia, when "such goods or credits of the defend-
ant are presently within said district, or there is a likelihood that they
soon will be there."5 In this case, Reibor served its processes of at-
tachment and garnishment on RBC and MHT four hours and three
days, respectively, before the CHIPS transfer passed through each
bank." At the very least, the time lapse of four hours, and perhaps of
three days, should fall within the acceptable time frame for attachment
of after-acquired property described by Professor Moore.
Reibor advocated a workable but legally unsupported standard for
effective attachment of after-acquired property, contending it is the
Supp. 164, which involved three writs of attachment on the same property, served June
5, 8 and 11, all by Schirmer Stevedoring Company. 759 F.2d at 265. Notwithstanding the
fact that that court was determining the priority of competing attachments against a
bankrupt, and was thus distinguishing the writs for that purpose only, see 208 F. Supp.
at 171, the Reibor court concluded that "[i]f the June 5 writ had reached after-acquired
property, the later writs would not have had any bearing on the case." 759 F.2d at 265-
66. The Reibor court, incidentally, might have taken a lesson from the affirming Ninth
Circuit in American Smelting, which upheld the validity of the June 5 attachment (for
reasons not involving after-acquired property), while expressly avoiding a "hyper-techni-
cal construction" that would have invalidated the attachment. See 327 F.2d at 588.
Notably as well, the Reibor court disregarded the opinion of Judge Broderick in A/S
Kristian Jebsens Rederi v. Al-Haddad Bros. Enters., Inc., 84 Civ. 7070 (S.D.N.Y. October
10, 1984), in which he upheld the validity of an attachment of the proceeds of a letter of
credit, even though the required draw down documents were not submitted to the bank
until after the writ was served. Judge Broderick wrote: "I don't think there is anything
unique in the concept that attachment can run to proceeds to be received as well as
assets previously held. This is an admiralty action or claim. The attachment provisions
with respect to admiralty claims are to be liberally construed." Id., cited in Reibor Brief,
supra note 4, at 15.
53. Reibor, No. 83-793, slip op. at 3.
54. FED. R. Civ. P. B(1) (emphasis added).
55. 7A MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 39, 1 B.03 at B-105 (emphasis added).
56. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
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usual course of conduct in the maritime community: "A much more
logical line to draw is to permit attachment of after-acquired property
up to the time the garnishee answers the interrogatories [pursuant to
Rule B(3) (a)]. This is, in fact, the present practice in the international
maritime community."5 Such a "gentlemen's agreement" presumably
accounts for the dearth of case law on the issue." Supporting Reibor's
position, however, is the historical judicial treatment of maritime at-
tachment and garnishment, which may be reasonably construed to al-
low effective attachment of after-acquired property. This judicial treat-
ment may suggest that garnishors, in order to effect an attachment,
should not be required to serve process at the precise moment elec-
tronic impulses "conveying" the sought-after funds pass through the
garnishee banks."9
57. Appellant's Reply Brief at 7, Reibor Int'l Ltd. v. Cargo Carriers (Kacz-Co.) Ltd.,
759 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Reibor Reply Brief]. See also, Kohn, Circuit
Court Places Curb on Maritime Attachments, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 18, 1985, at 1 col. 3,
wherein Mr. Kohn reported:
According to those familiar with the issue, admiralty lawyers always have
relied on an attachment being effective while awaiting the reply in court of a
garnishee, generally a bank, which may take twenty days. During that time, the
garnishment has been thought effective, even if the assets arrive after the at-
tachment first is served.
Id.
58. See infra notes 77 and 103 and accompanying text for a discussion on the re-
sponse of the court to this practice.
59. Given the procedure of CHIPS, under Judge Stewart's strict requirement for ef-
fective attachment, see Reibor, No. 83-793, slip op. at 3, it is arguable that attachment
against a receiving bank, such as RBC, is effective only if made after the settlement of
Clearing House funds has occurred and the receiving bank has in fact received the funds
which had earlier in the day been promised. At the time MHT made its payment mes-
sage to CHIPS to credit RBC, those instructions as to MHT became irrevocable. See
CHIPS Rules, supra note 24, Rule 2. Although RBC was advised, at that moment, of a
credit from MHT, supra note 30, settlement of th funds was not effected until around
6:00 p.m., supra note 35. Such a strict requirement, however, improperly ignores custom-
ary banking practices: as was the case with RBC, many receiving banks will dispose of
the funds they have only been advised of, before settlement at the end of the day. See
supra note 19. See also, Scott, Corporate Wire Transfers and the Uniform New Pay-
ments Code, 83 COLUM. L.R. REv. 1664 (1983) [hereinafter Scott, Corporate Wire Trans-
fers]. One additional issue that arises in this context is the effectiveness of attachment as
against the sending bank, here MHT, after it sends its generally irrevocable payment
message but before it settles its accounts at the end of the day.
These issues and others expressly unaddressed by the court of appeals, see 759 F.2d
at 268-69, clearly indicate that the typical CHIPS transaction does not neatly fit the
definitions of "after-acquired property" or defendant's credits "in the hands of garnish-
ees." Indeed, due to the nature of CHIPS, a significant difficulty arises, for purposes of
Rule B, in determining when the property sought to be attached is in the hands of gar-
nishee banks. Although efforts are under way to "regulate the myriad issues that arise in
connection with the transfer of funds by wire," Scott, Corporate Wire Transfers, supra,
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A. Federal Judicial Treatment of the Maritime Attachment
Remedy
The essential purposes of the maritime attachment remedy are
well settled.60 In the event the defendant is not to be found within the
district, as Reibor verified in this case,"' the remedy in its modern ex-
ercise serves a dual purpose: first to obtain in personam jurisdiction
over the defendant by attachment of his property within the district,
and second to assure satisfaction of any decree in plaintiff's favor."
The Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of which Rule B is a part, were
promulgated in 1966.68 Rule B(1) was drafted to preserve "the tradi-
at 1679, the historical application of the maritime attachment remedy, and other bases of
decision discussed infra, offer workable alternatives to the court's strict construction.
Recognizing "the fact that the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) did not cover elec-
tronic funds transfer transactions could create a serious problem in our legal system,"
Scott, An Introduction to the Uniform New Payments Code, in UNIFORM Naw PAY-
MENTS CODE 1 (P.E.B. Draft No. 3, 1983) (Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform
Commercial Code), the Code drafters attempted to devise a statutory framework appli-
cable "to any orders payable by or at, or transmitted by or to an account institution." Id.
at 4.
Section 426 of the Code is designed to deal with situations involving the rights of
third parties, particularly attachment, where otherwise preferable contractual relation-
ships are inapplicable because "one would not know which potential attachors to deal
with in advance." Id. at 42. The section states in relevant part:
(1) A claim to an account is asserted by ...
(b) the service of legal process ...
(2) Any claim described in subsection (1) is timely to terminate, suspend or
modify the payor account institution's right or duty to pay an order or to charge
its customer's account if it is asserted early enough for the account institution to
act thereon in a reasonable time before the account institution has done any of
the following;
(a) accepted or certified the order;
(b) paid the order in cash;
(c) become liable for the order under subsection (3) of Section 420 or
Section 423; or
(d) exercised its right of setoff.
Id. at 305.
60. See, e.g., Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Columbiana del Caribe, S.A., 339 U.S.
684, 693 (1950); Chilean Line Inc. v. United States, 344 F.2d 757, 760 (2d Cir. 1965).
61. See FED. R. Civ. P. B(1), which requires that plaintiff's complaint "be accompa-
nied by an affidavit signed by the plaintiff or his attorney that, to the affiant's knowl-
edge, or to the best of his information and belief, the defendant cannot be found within
the district."
62. Chilean Line, 344 F.2d at 760; Seawind Compania S.A. v. Crescent Line Inc., 320
F.2d 580, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1963).
63. 7A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 39, 1 B.01[1].
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tional maritime remedy of attachment and garnishment,"" but certain
changes were made from the previous practice, the effect of which was
"to enlarge the class of cases in which the plaintiff may proceed by
attachment or garnishment although jurisdiction of the person of the
defendant may be independently obtained." 5 Moreover, the attach-
ment remedy is frequently relied upon to provide the plaintiff with se-
curity to assure satisfaction in the event of a judgment in the plaintiff's
favor.60 This discussion will address the ramifications of using Rule B
to further the dual purposes noted above; it will not consider other
issues implicated by the use of the rule. 7
A significant characteristic of maritime attachment is the flexibil-
ity historically exercised by admiralty courts.s The Second Circuit has
noted the "decades of judicial liberality toward the use of writs of mar-
itime attachment, a remedy which the Supreme Court has viewed with
favor from the time of Manro v. Almeida. . . ."6 Professor Moore has
similarly recognized the flexible judicial treatment of maritime attach-
ment: "The feature most distinguishing maritime attachments from
analogous state and federal proceedings is the former's broad applica-
tion and lack of restrictions. '70 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
64. FED. R. Civ. P. B(1) advisory committee note (1966), reprinted in 7A MooRE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 39, t B.01[2].
65. Id.
66. See supra note 62; see also, e.g., Construction Exporting Enters. v. Nikki Mari-
time Ltd., 558 F. Supp. 1372, 1375 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
67. Reference is made here to other areas of concern with respect to the maritime
attachment remedy. For example, Rule B has recently been constitutionally challenged
in a number of courts on due process grounds. See, e.g., Schiffahrtsgesellschaft Leon-
hardt & Co. v. A. Bottacchi S.A. De Navegacion, 732 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984); Polar
Shipping Ltd. v. Oriental Shipping Corp., 680 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982). The United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, in which Reibor was heard,
recently considered Rule B(1) in conjunction with the Southern District's local Admi-
ralty Rule 13 and found no constitutional defects. Int'l Ocean Way Corp. of Monrovia v.
Hyde Park Navigation, Ltd., 555 F. Supp. 1047 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). These constitutional
concerns have been obviated, however, by recent amendments to Rules B and C,
designed "to provide for judicial scrutiny before the issuance of any attachment or gar-
nishment process [or any warrant of arrest]." See FED. R Civ. P. B(1) advisory commit-
tee note (1985 amendments), reprinted in 7A MoORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 39,
at 41-42 (Supp. 1985-86). For a discussion on the differences between in personam and in
rem claims in an admiralty action, see Belcher Co. of Ala., Inc. v. MAN Maratha Mariner,
724 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1984); G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY, § 1-12
(2d ed. 1975).
68. See, e.g., 7A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 39, at B.02.
69. Maryland Tuna Corp. v. MS Benares, 429 F.2d 307, 321 (2d Cir. 1970).
70. 7A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 39, B.02 at B-54.
Professor Moore continues:
The sole prerequisites of maritime attachment are that there be a maritime
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Circuit has recently recognized this tradition of judicial treatment, in
the context of a due process challenge to Rule B, in Schiffahrtsgesell-
schaft Leonhardt & Co. v. A. Bottachi S.A. De Navegacion." The
court's analysis stressed the procedural flexibility of Rule B and, al-
though directed at due process considerations, that analysis is equally
applicable here. The Schiffahrtsgesellschaft court was persuaded by
the analytical approach of the Fourth and Fifth Circuits in similar
cases, s in which those courts "relied upon the distinct legal foundation
of admiralty law, the historical application of the .. .procedures [of
Rules B and C,73 ] and the transient nature of maritime property to
scrutinize the procedural safeguards of Rules B and C under more leni-
ent standards."' This judicial notion of flexibility and liberality may
be construed as responsive to the issue of the effective attachment of
after-acquired property, such that attachment should be deemed
effective.7
5
For this reason and others discussed throughout this comment, the
court should have relied on Federal admiralty law to find the attach-
ment effective against after-acquired property. The court however, re-
lying instead on state law, did not agree.76
B. Propriety of Reliance on State Law
The court of appeals agreed with the district court that "the pre-
cedent in Federal admiralty law is so thin that we should turn to state
law more directly on point."77 The court added: "We clearly have this
cause of action for which an action in personam is available and that the defend-
ant cannot be found within the district of the court wherein the cause is com-
menced-and, this has been construed as meaning that he cannot be "found"
both for purposes of obtaining in personam jurisdiction and for effectuating ser-
vice of process. Unlike many statutes providing for attachment, it matters not
that the defendant may be a "resident" of the district or that the cause of action
did not arise therein .... Once the minimal prerequisites above referred to
have been fulfilled, an admiralty claimant has traditionally been permitted to
proceed with a maritime attachment.
Id. at B-54, 55.
71. 732 F.2d at 1546-48.
72. Amstar Corp. v. S/S Alexandros T., 664 F.2d 904 (4th Cir. 1981); Merchants Nat'l
Bank of Mobile v. Dredge General G.L. Gillespie, 663 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
dismissed, 456 U.S. 966 (1982), cited with approval in Schiflahrtsgeselischaft, 732 F.2d
at 1546.
73. See Belcher Co. of Ala., 724 F.2d at 1163-64; GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 67.
Rule C deals with in rem actions.
74. 732 F.2d at 1547.
75. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
76. 759 F.2d at 266.
77. Id.
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option where we find it appropriate."' O In asserting this option, the
court offered as support California ex rel. State Lands Comm'n v.
United States,7 ' wherein the Supreme Court had stated: "It may be
determined as a matter of choice of law that, although federal law
should govern a given question,"0 state law should be borrowed and
applied as the federal rule for deciding the substantive legal issue at
hand."81
In the past, the Supreme Court has addressed the propriety of re-
liance by Federal courts on state law in deciding Federal questions.8 2
The Court has recognized, as did the Second Circuit, that
"[clontroversies .... although governed by federal law, do not inevi-
tably require resort to uniform federal rules.' 3 As characterized in
United States v. Kimbell Foods, "[w]hether to adopt state law or to
fashion a nationwide federal rule is a matter of judicial policy 'depen-
dent upon a variety of considerations always relevant to the nature of
78. Id. (footnote omitted). The omitted footnote made reference to Maryland Tuna,
429 F.2d at 321, which discusses in strong language the independence of maritime at-
tachment from state law. See discussion infra at note 97 and accompanying text.
79. 457 U.S. 273 (1982).
80. Cf. Maryland Tuna, 429 F.2d at 321 ("The remedy under Rule B(1) is completely
independent of state law . . ... "). For a discussion on the governance of federal law to
issues of maritime attachment, see infra notes 101 et seq. and accompanying text.
81. 457 U.S. at 283.
82. See id.; see also Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 671-72 (1979);
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727-29 (1979); United States v. Stan-
dard Oil Co. of Cal. 332 U.S. 301, 309-10 (1974). See generally Mishkin, The Variousness
of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State
Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. Rxv. 797 (1957).
83. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 727-28. It should be noted that these cases generally
deal with controversies involving specific federal interests, agencies or programs. See e.g.,
Wilson, 442 U.S. at 657 (action to quiet title to land claimed by the Omaha Indian Tribe,
supported by the United States as trustee of the Tribe's reservation lands); Kimbell
Foods, 440 U.S. at 718 (priority of contractual liens arising from certain federal loan
programs); Standard Oil, 332 U.S. at 301 (suit by the United States to recover on a claim
arising out of injuries sustained by a soldier, the expenses for which were borne by the
United States). Admittedly, the remedy of maritime attachment is not as such part of a
federal agency or program. This comment submits nonetheless that the reasoning of the
Supreme Court is applicable to maritime attachment, and that challenges to that sub-
mission based on nonpertinence must fail, for two reasons. First, the Reibor court itself
relied on State Lands Comm'n (which, in turn, relied on this trend of cases, see 457 U.S.
at 283), although the Reibor court neglected to consider the rationale for relying on state
law as developed in these cases. See 759 F.2d at 266; see also discussion supra note 77
and accompanying text. Second, given the strong tradition of Federal governance of ad-
miralty issues, see discussion infra at notes 36-40 and 60-74 and accompanying text, it is
virtually a premise that maritime attachment as codified in Rule B implicates a federal
interest sufficient to justify the application of the tests of Kimbell Foods and Standard
oil.
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the specific governmental interests and to the effects upon them of ap-
plying state law.' "84 Such considerations include the need for uniform-
ity,8 the question of whether Congress has taken no action to change
long-settled ways of handling the problem,86 the question of whether
application of state law would frustrate specific objectives of the Fed-
eral program,8 7 and lastly, the "extent to which application of a federal
rule would disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state law." 8
1. Uniformity in Federal Admiralty Law
With regard to an ostensible need for uniformity in admiralty law,
the nature of that law should be recognized. Federal judicial power is
extended by the Constitution "to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction . . . ."8 National uniformity in admiralty procedural
practice extends back to the Supreme Court Admiralty Rules of 1844,
which "codified and made uniform the prior practice."90 Lastly, in
what has been termed "a classical exposition of the roles of Court and
Congress in the admiralty field,"91 Chief Justice Hughes wrote in 1934:
"The framers of the Constitution did not contemplate that the mari-
time law should remain unalterable. The purpose was to place the en-
tire subject, including its substantive as well as its procedural features,
under national control."
'
9
With these considerations in mind, one may examine the reliance
on state law by the Reibor court. As RBC indicated in its brief,93 Sup-
plemental Rule A authorizes resort to the "general Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure . . . except to the extent that they are inconsistent with these
Supplemental Rules."" Rule 64, in turn, allows that attachment reme-
dies "are available under the circumstances and in the manner pro-
vided by the law of the state in which the district court is held.
84. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728, quoting Standard Oil, 332 U.S. at 310.
85. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728; Standard Oil, 332 U.S. at 310.
86. Standard Oil, 332 U.S. at 310.
87. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728. As discussed in note 83, supra, the maritime
attachment remedy is not of a federal program per se, so the discussion will focus on the
important federal interests implicated.
88. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 729.
89. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (A.
Hamilton).
90. 7A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 39, B.02 at B-53. For a brief discus-
sion of the "considerable difference of practice" of maritime attachment before the pro-
mulgation of the 1844 Rules, see id. at B-53 n.8.
91. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 67, § 9-49 at 694.
92. Detroit Trust Co. v. The Barium, 293 U.S. 21, 43 (1934).
93. RBC Brief, supra note 18, at 9.
94. FED. R. Civ. P. A.
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[except that] any existing statute of the United States governs to the
extent to which it is applicable. ' 5 While the issue of applicability of
Federal precedent, to the preclusion of reliance on state law, was ar-
gued by the parties,96 one underlying factor should be borne in mind:
reliance on state law to govern Rule B attachments could conceivably
result in up to fifty varying applications of the Rule. Such a result
would not comport with the foregoing discussion on the long recog-
nized necessity for national uniformity in admiralty law. Indeed, this
necessity is supported by the Second Circuit's statement against the
application of state law to Supplemental Rule B(1), when it wrote in
Maryland Tuna that "State law is irrelevant to the validity of process
under Supplemental Rule B(1). . . .The remedy, under the terms of
Rule B(1), is completely independent of state law and of any state at-
tachment or garnishment procedures.'9 Thus, while reliance by a
court on state procedure in an admiralty issue may be appropriate in
other circumstances, here the historical context and judicial treatment
of the admiralty law offers a strong policy favoring uniform
standards.9s
2. Congressional Inaction
The inaction of Congress to "change long-settled ways of han-
dling"" a particular problem is also relevant to this discussion, insofar
as the admiralty bar has uniformly interpreted Rule B "to permit at-
tachment of after-acquired property up to the time the garnishee an-
95. FED. R. Civ. P. 64.
96. See 759 F.2d at 265-66. See discussion supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
97. Maryland Tuna, 429 F.2d at 321. The Reibor court felt it had the option to rely
on state law "despite [the] strong language," Reibor, 759 F.2d at 266 n.3, of Maryland
Tuna. The Reibor court continued: "Here, as a matter of federal law, we choose to follow
the applicable state law. State law remains irrelevant to the validity of a maritime at-
tachment because it is federal law that determines what attachments are valid." Id. The
court is apparently drawing a distinction between the validity of attachments, which it
concedes Federal law alone may govern, and the effectiveness of attachments, against
which it here seeks to apply state law. Such a hypertechnical distinction, however, flies
against both the spirit of Maryland Tuna and the broad and flexible application of Rule
B historically accorded by the Federal judiciary. See discussion, supra notes 64-78 and
accompanying text.
98. See generally Note, Adopting State Law as the Federal Rule of Decision: A Pro-
posed Test, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 823 (1976). "When a lack of uniformity would actually
interfere with the functioning of a specific federal program for interest, as this comment
suggests, see supra note 83] . . .the interest in uniformity deserves weight according to
the amount of interference." Note, supra, at 841.
99. 332 U.S. at 310. "Congress has undoubted power to regulate the practice and
procedure of federal courts ...." Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 312 U.S. 1, 9 (1941).
(Vol. 6
MARITIME ATTACHMENT
swers the interrogatories."' °
3. The Inter-relationship of Federal and State Objectives: Disruption
of Banking Practices
Lastly, one may consider together the frustration of Federal inter-
ests if state law were applied, and conversely, the disruption of "com-
mercial relationships predicated on state law" 10' if a conflicting Federal
rule were to be applied. The foregoing discussion on the strong Federal
policy favoring uniformity is responsive to the former concern, despite
the fact that it was cursorily addressed by the court."'0 The latter con-
cern, conversely, was the focal point of the court's justification for rely-
ing on state law.
The court rejected as inapposite the Federal precedent cited by
Reibor, and justified its reliance on state law as "especially appropriate
where, as here, 'a decision. . . contrary to the general rule of the state
might have disruptive consequences for the state banking system.' 11103
Relying on New York law, the court proceeded to reject Reibor's con-
tention that the garnishment writ should "remain effective until the
garnishee answers, under Rule B(3) a period controlled by garnishee
and not exceeding twenty days."'1 4 The court contended that it would
be overly "burdensome to require a garnishee to choose between set-
ting aside other priorities to answer promptly and remaining vigilant
until an answer can be prepared."' 0 5 The court concluded its reasoning
by stating:
[T]he law of attachment could have considerable impact on in-
ternational banking practices and indeed could force New York
100. Reibor Reply Brief, supra note 57, at 7. See also supra note 57 and accompany-
ing text.
101. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 729.
102. See, e.g., supra note 97.
103. 759 F.2d at 266, quoting Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab v. Sabre Shipping
Corp., 341 F.2d 50, 52-53 (2d Cir. 1965). The Reibor court contended: "New York being
the situs for multiple transactions in world commerce, the New York banking system is
particularly vulnerable to such disruption .... It is only appropriate therefore that we
look to the New York law of attachment for guidance." 759 F.2d at 266. This assertion
followed a line of reasoning offered by Judge Stewart in the district court opinion. He
contended similarly that there is "little federal precedent," Reibor, no. 83-793, slip op. at
3, on the issue of effective attachment of after-acquired property, but then seemingly
suggested that this is a banking issue, to be decided under state law. Id. at 4 ("questions
of banking are matters for state regulation"). This raises the question, had there been
sufficient Federal precedent on the issue of Rule B attachment of after-acquired prop-
erty, would the district court still have looked solely to state law for banking purposes?
104. 759 F.2d at 267.
105. Id.
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banks clearing foreign fund exchanges in U.S. dollars through
CHIPS to search high and low for a period of up to twenty
days to determine whether any transfer related to a maritime
process of attachment or garnishment. Moreover, this search
would be extremely and unfairly taxing because garnishee
banks like MHT/NY and RBC/NY have no way to anticipate
when they will transfer or receive a CHIPS credit . . . . The
rule works, to be sure, to the detriment of an attaching credi-
tor, but that is simply the way the law was intended to
operate. '
In its rationale, the court strove for an ostensibly pragmatic per-
spective, citing, in its view, the practical and expensive difficulties a
garnishee would face in tracking down garnished credits. Worthy of
note, however, is the fact that the court omitted any support for its
portrait of the chaotic banking operations that allegedly would result
should such attachment be allowed. More likely, the court-depicted
scenario would not result, and the actual operation would be no more
commercially burdensome than that allowed under current garnish-
ment procedure.
Initially, one may consider the court's assertion that reliance on
New York law was appropriate here, given the vulnerability of New
York banking to disruption. Had there been clear Federal precedent
allowing the attachment of after-acquired property, the court would
have had to disregard apprehension of possible disruptive results.107
The court, however, was able to address this issue, but seemed to ig-
nore the effectiveness with which other banking credits have been at-
tached. Clearly, bank accounts may be attached, yet there are no con-
cerns voiced over any disruptions effected by these allowable
attachments. In the present case, therefore, disruption alone is clearly
insufficient to support reliance on state law. Moreover, there is no rea-
son to believe that the state banking system was intended to receive
the protection of a restrictive state attachment law in an admiralty
context, particularly in view of the broad and flexible treatment histor-
ically accorded the maritime attachment remedy.
The court's distinction regarding the burdens that the banking
system would face if the attachment of after-acquired CHIPS credits
were allowed is specious. Given the realistic operation of the CHIPS
106. Id. at 268. This comment submits that this is not "the way the law was intended
to operate." Id. Rule B is designed to protect the creditor's rights. See infra text accom-
panying note 147 and supra text accompanying note 40.
107. See supra note 103.
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department of a bank,108 there would be little burden on a garnishee
bank to trace and be aware of a CHIPS credit; certainly, as suggested
above, no more a burden than that posed by other attachable forms of
property held by the garnishee bank. In order to allow an attachment
of a CHIPS credit in the least burdensome manner," 9 however, certain
prerequisites are conceded. Crucial to a nonburdensome attachment is
the requirement that the item sought to be attached be properly iden-
tified.1 0 Thus, the attaching plaintiff must provide specific and de-
tailed information in the writ so that the CHIPS credit may be easily
traced and identified. Such information might include, but need not be
limited to, an estimation of the time at which the transfer will be ef-
fected, the precise amount of the forthcoming transfer, its origin, its
destination, the sending and receiving parties and their account
numbers.
This information would, upon proper service to the garnishee
bank, be circulated to the various departments of the bank that may
have property of the defendant. A search would then be made by each
department for such property, relying on the identifying information
contained in the writ. In the event of a writ against a CHIPS credit,
with the requisite specific advance knowledge of forthcoming identifi-
able proceeds, the operators of the computer terminals at which
CHIPS transactions are effected among member banks would need
108. The court's brief description of the operation of CHIPS was incomplete and in
error. The court noted that, despite the completion of the transfers among member
banks, "adjustments in the account books at the New York Federal Reserve Bank are
not made until the next business day, . . . after the central computer has determined
which banks owe, or are owed, what." 759 F.2d at 264 n.1. In fact, same-day settlement
was effected October 1, 1981, Bennett, supra note 28, some three and one-half years
before this case was decided. Such a mis-statement betrays the court's ignorance of the
operation of CHIPS and, accordingly, seriously undermines the credibility of its prag-
matic assertions, given the necessity of an accurate knowledge of CHIPS to those
assertions.
109. The court's reasoning suggests that achieving the least burden for the garnishee
is a primary concern of an attachment (notwithstanding the type of property sought to
be attached). This discussion will illustrate that the burden is not great, and is indeed
merely routine, such that the rejection as "burdensome" of attachment of after-acquired
property is obviated.
Information provided herein on the practical demands that attachment would make
on a CHIPS bank was provided to the author by the head of CHIPS operations for a
CHIPS-member bank in New York City, in a personal interview on January 16, 1985 and
a telephone interview on January 8, 1986. This individual did not wish to be identified,
for the obvious reason that his statements are adverse to the interests of the New York
banking community. An effort is thus made to present as complete a picture of CHIPS
operations, and the effects thereon of attachment, as possible, to preclude rebuttal based
on inaccuracy.
110. See infra note 123.
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only be "on guard" for its receipt. With the requirement for sufficient
advance information of CHIPS credits, there conceivably would be no
difference between the burden the bank may have in searching for ac-
counts under its control, though not sufficiently identified,' and the
burden to be watchful for what presumably would be an imminently
arriving CHIPS transaction. In short, the burden to search for poorly
identified but currently held property, the attachment for which would
be upheld,""2 is at least as great as the burden to be watchful for pre-
cisely identified but soon-to-be acquired property. Thus, the ground of
undue burden on garnishee banks is inconsistently applied and there-
fore should be rejected.
Indeed, the real burden in this scenario rests with the attaching
creditor to provide sufficient identifying information. Given the need
for such information, there is little reason for the attaching creditor to
seek an attachment of the CHIPS credit unless he has definite knowl-
edge of the imminent transfer; otherwise the remedy will prove of little
use to him. The burden is thus so substantial that the remedy is un-
likely to be utilized frivolously.
The foregoing discussion has suggested that the Reibor court's re-
liance on state law was misplaced, and that attachment of the after-
acquired CHIPS credit should have been allowed. Such a finding, how-
ever, would be only a threshold resolution, for there remains the much
more problematic dispute, expressly unaddressed by the court," s over
whether a CHIPS credit constitutes attachable property." '
III. ATTACHMENT OF CHIPS CREDITS
Although this issue was central in the briefed arguments of the
parties before the Second Circuit, few cases in fact define the Rule
B(1) language of attachable "goods and chattels, or credits and effects"
of defendants." 5 The primary contention of garnishee MHT regarding
111. See e.g., DK Mfg., 1964 A.M.C. at 79-80 (such after-identified accounts are prop-
erly attached, see supra note 51).
112. DK Mfg., 1964 A.M.C. at 79-80.
113. 759 F.2d at 268-69.
114. Indeed, the court's hypertechnical opinion, characterized by a disregard of both
the historical judicial treatment of Rule B and the actual operation of CHIPS, enabled it
to avoid this tougher question.
115. See generally 7A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 39, B.04. Professor
Moore writes: "The law is clear that debts or credits located within the district and
which are owed to a defendant who cannot be found therein may be garnished." Id. at B-
160. This observation is qualified, however, by concerns on the question of situs and
maturity of the debt. Id. at B-160-62. Such concerns are not relevant to this discussion,
as the CHIPS credit sought to be attached in Reibor was located within the district.
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the attachability of CHIPS transactions was that the CHIPS transfer
was not attachable property of defendant Cargo Carriers, but was
rather "an interbank transfer of funds belonging solely to the
banks."' 16 Moreover, contended MHT, "the CHIPS transfer did not
represent a[n attachable] debt owed by MHT/NY to Cargo [Carri-
ers].1 117 Garnishee RBC echoed this contention that New York branch
banks acting as CHIPS participants do not themselves owe debts to
the ultimate beneficiary. RBC asserted that it had no contractual lia-
bility to, or privity with, Cargo Carriers, but only to the sender of the
payment instructions, MHT."' RBC added that under the rules gov-
erning CHIPS, 19 it "would be liable only to MHT for misapplying
funds under MHT's instructions. 1 20 In reply, Reibor contended that
CHIPS credits are property of the defendant and thus subject to at-
tachment,"' and contended further that had one of the garnishees di-
verted the transferred funds, the garnishee would in fact be liable to
Cargo Carriers. 22 Although other issues were raised by the parties, this
discussion will be limited to the issue of attachability of the CHIPS
transfer. l s
One case which was relied upon to further the contentions of both
Reibor and the garnishees was Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. European
Am. Bank & Trust Co.12 4 At issue was whether CHIPS transactions
116. Brief of Garnishee-Appellee Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. at 18, Reibor
Int'l Ltd. v. Cargo Carriers (Kacz-Co.) Ltd., 759 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1985) [hereinafter
MHT Brief). Two cases relied upon by MHT in making this contention, Delbrueck & Co.
v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 464 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 609 F.2d 1047
(2d Cir. 1979) and Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. European Am. Bank & Trust Co., 576 F.
Supp. 950 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), are discussed infra at notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
117. MHT Brief, supra note 116, at 21.
118. RBC Brief, supra note 18, at 19-20.
119. CHIPS Rules, supra note 24.
120. RBC Brief, supra note 18, at 20.
121. Reibor Reply Brief, supra note 57, at 11-13.
122. Id. at 13. The case principally relied upon by Reibor in making this contention,
Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 522 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. III. 1981), rev'd, 673 F.2d 951
(7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1983), is discussed infra at notes 133-37 and
accompanying text.
123. RBC strongly argued that the Process of Maritime Attachment and Garnish-
ment served on it did not provide a sufficient description of the property sought to be
attached, and thus as a matter of law the process could not effect an attachment of the
CHIPS credit. RBC Brief, supra note 18, at 16-19; Reibor Reply Brief, supra note 57, at
8-11. For purposes of this comment it is assumed that the process contains a sufficient
description to locate and garnish the property.
MHT argued at length that the debt owed Cargo Carriers was located in Madrid,
not New York, and thus was not attachable. MHT Brief, supra note 116, at 26-30;
Reibor Reply Brief, supra note 57, at 14-15. See supra note 115.
124. 576 F. Supp. 950. See also FDIC Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1813(1) (1976).
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constituted deposits for the purpose of calculating FDIC insurance as-
sessment payments. MHT construed FDIC as holding that "CHIPS
transactions are deposits of the bank and represent assets of the
bank." " While holding that CHIPS transactions are deposits to be
considered in determining FDIC assessments, and that CHIPS instruc-
tions represent "a firm obligation to credit a commercial ac-
count. . ",Y" the FDIC court did not expressly address the owner-
ship of those deposits, the necessary aspect for the present attachment
analysis. An implication was raised by Reibor, however, that by hold-
ing that CHIPS payments are deposits to be insured by the FDIC for
the benefit of third parties, those CHIPS transactions may be deemed
attachable property of those third parties.
1 7
For its contention that "an interbank transfer [consists] of funds
belonging solely to the banks,"'2 8 MHT relied on Delbrueck & Co. v.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.' 2 9 In Delbrueck, the plaintiff was a
German banking partnership that charged its bank with negligence for
failing to comply with its demand to revoke CHIPS transfers that the
bank had made pursuant to the plaintiff's instructions earlier in the
day. The issue in Delbrueck, the revocability of CHIPS transfers, nec-
essarily involved a consideration of transfers between banks, but this is
similarly not responsive to the issue of ownership of the transferred
funds, which is the crucial aspect of the attachment considerations
herein.
A third issue addressed by the parties in their arguments relating
to the attachability of CHIPS transfers involved the rules governing
CHIPS. 30 RBC contended that the CHIPS Rules relating to liability
indicate that participating banks are liable only to each other."3 ' These
rules, however, do not insulate participating banks from liability by
third parties. By requiring the banks to, in effect, "settle among them-
selves," 12 the CHIPS Rules only insulate the NYCHA from involve-
ment in and liability for any errors, whether caused by the system or
by participating banks. To support its contention that the CHIPS
credit was attachable property of the defendant, Reibor turned to the
125. MHT Brief, supra note 116, at 19.
126. 576 F. Supp. at 956.
127. Reibor Reply Brief, supra note 57, at 12-13.
128. MHT Brief, supra note 116, at 19.
129. 464 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 609 F.2d 1047 (2d Cir. 1979).
130. CHIPS Rules, supra note 24.
131. See, e.g., id. at Rules 13, 15; RBC Brief, supra note 18, at 20.
132. See, e.g., Lingl, Payment Systems Differ on EFT Risk Allocation, American
Banker, Sept. 22, 1983, at 12. See also, Scott, Corporate Wire Transfers, supra note 59,
at 1673; Comment, supra note 24.
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district court opinion in Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp."'3 In that
case, a ship charterer sued Swiss Bank, a correspondent bank of its
own bank, Continental Illinois, for failure to make a wire transfer pay-
ment, which resulted in the cancellation of a ship charter. By analogiz-
ing the facts in that case to article 4 of the U.C.C., the district court
found that the bank was the plaintiff's agent and thus could be liable
to the charterer for its negligence in the wire transfer failure."3 4 Reibor
carried this analogy further by contending that Cargo Carriers, as the
ultimate beneficiary of the CHIPS transfers, would similarly have a
cause of action against RBC and MHT, thus creating the sufficient in-
terest of Cargo Carriers in the CHIPS credits to deem them
attachable. 35
Although Evra was reversed on appeal to the Seventh Circuit,136
that court did not expressly reverse the district court's U.C.C. article 4
analogy. The appellate court, however, did undermine the analogy by
refusing to apply article 4 of the U.C.C. to electronic fund transfers.
3 7
Accordingly, Reibor's extension of that analogy is tenuous at best.
One final issue may be considered in determining the "ownership"
of a CHIPS credit and its attachability. Irrevocability of the payment,
and implications for determining its ownership, arise in Reibor in two
contexts. First, insofar as the payment was made to the defendant pur-
suant to the irrevocable instructions in the letter of credit,13 8 there is a
suggestion that the funds constituting payment were the property of
defendant throughout their transfer, since, as beneficiary, only it could
revoke the credit. 39 This interpretation has been rejected in one case
in the Southern District of New York, Diakan Love, S.A. v. AI-Haddad
133. 522 F. Supp. 820.
134. Id. at 828. See also, Comment, Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp.: A Limitation on
Recovery of Consequential Damages in an Electronic Fund Transfer, 8 N.C.J. INT'L L. &
CoM. REG. 103, 105 (1982) ("Under U.C.C. § 4-201, a collecting bank's agency status with
respect to the owner of an item is presumed prior to the final settlement of an item").
135. Reibor Reply Brief, supra note 57, at 13.
136. 673 F.2d 951.
137. Id. at 955 ("Maybe the language of article 4 could be stretched to include elec-
tronic fund transfers, see section 4-102(2), but they were not in the contemplation of the
draftsmen"). Cf. Delbrueck, 609 F.2d at 1051, where the Second Circuit analogized
U.C.C. "concepts" to electronic funds transfers, while holding that the U.C.C. is inappli-
cable because it does not specifically address the problem of electronic fund transfers;
Comment, supra note 134, at 109 ("The majority of commentators have argued against
the direct application of the U.C.C. to situations involving electronic fund transfers").
These sources and others serve especially to underscore the notably incomplete statutory
framework applicable to electronic fund transfers. See generally, Scott, Corporate Wire
Transfers, supra note 59.
138. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
139. U.C.C. § 5-106(2).
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Bros. Enters., Inc., 14 0 wherein the court noted that to "permit the at-
tachment on theory that the letter [of credit] represents simply prop-
erty of the beneficiary would ignore and confound the inseparable in-
terests of other parties. ' '14 1 Conversely, another case in the Southern
District, A/S Kristian Jebsens Rederi v. At-Haddad Bros. Enters.,
Inc.,"82 expressly rejected the Diakan Love opinion.
The second aspect of irrevocability in Reibor lies in the nature of
the payment message sent by MHT into the CHIPS system: once the
payment message is sent, it is deemed irrevocable as to the sending
bank, which becomes obligated to settle the payment.14 3 This obliga-
tion imposed by the CHIPS Rules on the sending bank to pay the
amount to the receiving bank, however, does not necessarily extend
into an obligation on the sending bank to pay the beneficiary. Presum-
ably that obligation, as far as the circumstances of Reibor suggest,
would fall on the receiving bank, RBC. Thus, from this narrow per-
spective, the obligation of a receiving bank to the beneficiary may be
construed as attachable property of the beneficiary, whereas the obli-
gation of the sending bank would not be so construed.
A review of the arguments proffered by the parties shows no clear
and compelling support for any conclusion as to the attachability of
CHIPS transfers. Indeed, it is at this point in the analysis of this issue
that the lack of a legal framework that would address the rights and
liabilities of all the parties involved is most evident. Resort, therefore,
to the traditionally flexible application of the maritime attachment
remedy, would suggest a characterization of such transfers as attacha-
ble property of the defendant.
CONCLUSION
While this discussion has indicated the abundant lack of a coher-
ent legal framework that addresses the perplexing issues largely pecu-
liar to international interbank electronic funds transfers," particularly
the attachability of CHIPS credits, it has suggested the alternative,
policy-oriented concerns of the maritime attachment remedy that are
pertinent to this issue. The historical justification, for example, of mar-
140. 584 F. Supp. 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
141. Id. at 784. See also McLaughlin, Commercial Law: Letters of Credit, N.Y.L.J.,
Sept. 12, 1984, at 1, col. 1 (reviewing Diakan Love).
142. 84 Civ. 7070 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 1984), cited in Reibor Brief, supra note 4, at 15.
143. See CHIPS Rules, supra note 24, Rule 2 ("A payment message once released by
a participant ... constitutes the unconditional obligation of such participant to make
payment ...."); Delbrueck, 609 F.2d at 1051 (upholding the irrevocability of CHIPS
transfers); Scott, Corporate Wire Transfers, supra note 59, at 1690.
144. See supra notes 59, 108, 115-137, 143 and accompanying text.
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itime attachment suggests that it was to be an "easy and salutary rem-
edy" 5 for creditors. As the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
has observed, "relevant commercial and legal considerations provide
the backdrop for review"" 6 of Rule B. Although the Eleventh Circuit
evaluated the attachment of a vessel under Rule B, its observation re-
garding the ease of removal of a defendant's property from the juris-
diction of the court, to the frustration of creditors, is no less relevant
here. That court called Rule B "the harbinger of more happy endings
.... ,[The rule] restores order and attempts to protect the creditor's
rights. It draws debtors from otherwise impenetrable fortresses.
'
"147
Moreover, as this comment has pointed out, the maritime attachment
remedy has historically been accorded a broad, flexible and liberal ap-
plication in order to effect its purpose.
1 4 8
These observations, of course, should be considered in the context
of competing practical circumstances. Foremost, perhaps, is the "chil-
ling effect" that might result from the attachment of proceeds of let-
ters of credit, predicted in the Diakan Love case.14 9 Related to this is
the narrower chilling effect on CHIPS transactions that could result, if
the prediction of MHT holds true.150
Considering the practical necessity, however, of the sufficient iden-
tification of the transfer to effect the garnishment, the concern of
MHT is overstated. As suggested earlier,' 5 ' the burden is indeed upon
the attaching creditor, to come up with the necessary information. The
burden is difficult enough so that the number of attachments of
CHIPS credits would not be of sufficient magnitude to chill the use of
the system. Perhaps responsive to both concerns is the language of
Supplemental Rule E(5), which governs the release of attached prop-
erty.1 5 2 Rule E(5)(a) states that "whenever process of maritime attach-
145. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text; see also 2 A. BROWNE, A COMPEN-
DIOUS VIEW OF THE CIVIL LAW, AND OF THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 434 (1802), cited in Mary-
land Tuna, 429 F.2d at 321.
146. 732 F.2d at 1547.
147. Id. at 1548 (emphasis in original).
148. See supra notes 40, 59-74 and accompanying text.
149. 584 F. Supp. at 786 (If allowed to be attached, "the expectations supported by
letters of credit [would] be unfulfilled . . . . Such letters will cease to perform their es-
sential role in facilitating international trade, which as a result will be very substantially
impaired").
150. MHT Brief, supra note 116, at 2 (Reibor's "disregard of the far-reaching and
disruptive affect [sic] that attachment, under the circumstances of this case, would have
on the financial community, and ignorance of the serious impact on international trade
and commerce in New York that would follow, cannot be countenanced").
151. See supra text following note 112.
152. FED. R. Civ. P. E(5).
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ment and garnishment. . . is issued the execution of such process shall
be stayed, or the property released, on the giving of security con-
ditioned to answer the judgment of the court ... ."" Given the ease
with which attached property may be released, and the creditor's bur-
den to identify the property, the dire warnings of chilling effects may
be overstated.
Ultimately, the question rests on the dynamic role in financial
transactions that CHIPS electronic funds transfers now play, and will
continue to play in the future.'" Reibor realistically contended that
"[i]f the payment to Cargo Carriers had been passed through the same
garnishees but had been in the form of a check or cash, no argument
could be made that the funds were not subject to attachment."155 Due
to technological advances, such payments are now routinely made elec-
tronically: as such, should they remain immune to the liberal and flexi-
ble exercise of Rule B attachment? The Federal courts must be aware
of evolving commercial realities: "We have had abundant reason to re-
alize that our experience and new conditions give rise to new concep-
tions of maritime concerns,"15 wrote Chief Justice Hughes more than a
half century ago. Such "new conditions" are amidst the commercial
and maritime world today, and the resulting "new conceptions of mari-
time concerns" should be judicially recognized. Certainly, the Reibor
court's unwarrantedly restrictive curb on maritime attachments, inso-
far as it places electronic fund transfers effectively beyond the reach of
such levies, flies in the face of Chief Justice Hughes' counsel. Absent
such judicial recognition, if electronic fund transfers such as CHIPS
transactions continue to remain immune from the longstanding reach
of maritime attachment, then the remedy and the historically recog-
nized protections it seeks to afford will gradually but surely fade into
unwarranted discontinuance.
Thomas E. Tyler
153. Id. E(5) (a). Security would be provided in the form of a special bond delivered
into court.
154. See supra note 47.
155. Reibor Brief, supra note 4, at 16.
156. Detroit Trust Co. v. The Barium, 293 U.S. 21, 52 (1934).
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